I-Crisis Management and European Foreign Policies

A-The European Union in international relations

The development of a European capability for crisis management is the result of two movements: the extension of international competence of the European Communities since 1957 and the creation and development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy since 1992.

1) The Community and External Relations

The competences of the European Economic Community founded in 1957 were essentially economic and commercial. The monopoly of commercial relations between the Community and third countries has provided the European Commission with considerable weight in the international arena. Apart from the multilateral context of the GATT, Association Agreements have governed trade relations between the Community and certain States or third regional organisations since the 1960's. These Association Agreements were rapidly completed by Co-operation and Partnership Agreements that enabled the Community to extend its competence to domains such as co-operation, development aid and macro-economic support. Whilst negotiations relative to economic and political commitments linked to these Agreements led to in depth dialogue between the Commission and its partners the long term co-operation programmes were progressively completed by short term intervention tools designed to solve emergency situations and/or to launch the establishment of long term geographic tools. At the start of the 1990's the Community had a range of tools and instruments at its disposal enabling it to influence the internal development of its partners.

2) The Development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

The application of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 heralded the birth of the European Union. It has been built on three pillars: the institutions and competences rallied together by the European Communities since 1957; police and judicial co-operation; the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) decided upon and launched by the Member States who met in Council [3].

The first draft of the Common Foreign and Security Policy dates back to 1992. With the end of the Cold War and the start of the war in Yugoslavia, the Western European Union put forward the re-organisation of the armies of Europe with three fundamental missions as a basis: humanitarian and evacuation missions; peacekeeping missions; combat missions to manage crises and re-establish peace. These so-called Petersberg Missions were then incorporated in to the Treaty on the European Union [4] on signature of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The last treaty created the position of Secretary General of the Council of the European Union – High Representative for the CFSP (post granted to Javier Solana in 1999) providing the European Council with an enhanced orientation competence in terms of security and defence. In December 2000 the Nice Treaty decided the inclusion of the WEU within the European Union, created the permanent structures within the Secretariat General of the Council to address CFSP issues and defined Union relations generally with third countries and NATO in all matters related to defence.

The effective launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in fact dates back to the Franco-British Summit in Saint-Malo in December 1998. The objectives established during the summit with regard to European defence were ratified by the other Member States during the European Council of Cologne (June 1999). The European Council of Helsinki (December 1999) led to the definition of a Headline Goal that aimed to provide the EU with an (autonomous action capability supported by credible military forces" as well as by civil support forces [5]. The nature and importance of the civil capabilities were defined during the European Councils of Feira (June 2000) [6] and Göteborg (June 2001). In 2002, the ESDP was extended to the fight against terrorism whilst the modalities of co-operation between the ESDP and NATO were formalised [7]. In 2004 the Headline Goal 2010 was announced thereby extending and completing the Headline Goal defined in Helsinki in 1999 [8].

B- A European Definition of Management Crisis

The Petersberg tasks stress the maintenance or re-establishment of peace as well as the protection of civil populations; The European Strategy for Security published in 2003 adopted a more offensive notion of the European Policy for Crisis Management. The document highlights that in a world where "margins for manoeuvre" enjoyed by non-aligned organisations in playing a role in international affairs [9] had increased significantly since the end of the Cold War, European and international security could not be separated from the capability of all States to maintain order within their own territories. The "decline of States" which "undermine the world order and contribute to regional instability" appears therefore to be a serious threat. Re-establishing State authority in places where it is now absent or where is has disappeared comprises the ultimate aim of the European Policy for Crisis Management

When considered from the point of view of supporting or building States, crisis management operations comprise several phases: prevention, that attempts to prevent the start of internal conflicts and the collapse of central authorities; intervention, that aims to end internal conflict when this has started; stabilisation, that immediately follows intervention; and material and institutional reconstruction, that aims to re-establish legitimate and effective State authority.

II- Management Crisis in Action

A- European Players in Crisis Management

1) The Community Institutions

The European Commission deploys its external and crisis management policy using five Directorates General (External Relations, Trade, Enlargement, Development [10], Humanitarian Aid [11]) controlled by four Commissioners [12] that comprise the Commissioners' Group for External Relations presided over by the President of the Commission.

The crisis management tools at the Commission's disposal are mainly preventive and long term in nature [13]. The various geographic Agreements between the Community and its partners include various modalities that can have several objectives [14], such as political dialogue; economic and trade agreements; macro-economic support; co-operation and development aid; emergency aid; reconstruction aid [15]. The launch of these various tools and means is governed by the respect of certain political criteria by the Union's partners particularly with regard to good government. The Commission can also decide to suspend these Agreements within the context of sanctions adopted against a delinquent State [16].

Over the last few years the Commission has also provided itself with sectoral tools enabling it to act in emergency situations or in environments that are politically unstable [17]. These tools go beyond prevention and involve stabilisation and reconstruction phases both inside and outside of the Union borders. Their deployment is part of a rapid decision making system. The main instruments are:

The role of the Commission in the CFSP is much more modest [20]. The Unity for the Prevention of Conflicts and Crisis Management within the Department A (CFSP) of the RELEX DG is however responsible for co-ordinating the Commission's activities relative to the prevention of conflicts, notably action undertaken by the RRM. Its role comprises the provision of technical expertise with regard to all civil aspects pertaining to crisis management. It also participates in the strategic monitoring of potential crisis zones in co-operation with the Situation Centre. Its activities have notably enabled the integration of conflict prevention indicators within assistance programmes concluded with third countries.

2) The Council of the European Union

The Council of the European Union is the permanent administration associated with the Council of Ministers. According to the Maastricht Treaty the latter is responsible for the definition and implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. To do this it has progressively provided itself with a series of organisations that enable it to set down and apply a common crisis management policy.

The division of the Council responsible for defining the CFSP is the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) that brings together the Foreign Ministers from the Member States. The meetings of these are prepared by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). The GAERC is helped in its work by a series of organisations linked to the Council and the Secretariat:

3) The other players: alliances, regional organisations and third States

The hybrid nature of crisis management operations implies that the European Union rarely acts alone. The intervention phase that demands in particular the employment of force requires both an international mandate (generally the agreement of the UN Security Council) and the collaboration of organisations of third States, neighbours to the crisis zone or the EU's traditional allies.

Of the alliances that are likely to back European interventions NATO is one of the foremost [21]. Regional organisations with whom the Union works notably include the African Union [22] or the ASEAN. As for third States their contribution is now the subject of participation agreements [23], which govern the modalities of the work with the Union.

B- Crisis Management in Action

1) Decision Making

The European Union has provided itself with rapid decision making procedures enabling it to adapt its intervention tools to the various stages of a crisis.

We can distinguish the routine phase (monitoring, planning, anticipation and early warning phase); the development of the crisis and the drawing up of a concept to manage it (after the start of the crisis, if the PSC believes that EU intervention might be appropriate it draws up a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) which lays down the EU's political interests, the final objective as well as the main strategic options available); the approval of the concept and the development of strategic options (after approval of the CMC by the Council, the PSC tells the EUMC to draw up the strategic military options as well as any possible strategic options for civil and police action); the formal decision to act and the drawing up of plans (the Council can then, according to article 25 of the EUT delegate power to the PSC enabling it to ensure the political control and strategic management of the operation); the application of the chosen measures, finally the refocusing of EU action and the end of the operation [24].

2) Funding Operations

The funding modalities of operations are governed by article 28.3 of the Treaty on the European Union. Civil crisis management operations are funded by the CFSP budget (provided with a total of 62.6 million euro in 2005) [25], which is a part of the community budget managed by the Commission but the use of which is decided by the Council.

Operations that involve military intervention cannot however be financed by community funds. A part of this spending is mutualised and split between Member States according to their GDP. An administrative and financial mechanism called Athena manages joint costs since 2004 [26], from the preparatory phase to the end of operations [27]. The remainder of spending is financed directly by the Member States according to their participation. In practice less than 10% of the total cost of a military crisis management operation is mutualised.

3) Union Operations

For three years now the Union has increased the crisis management operations in which it is involved within its immediate neighbourhood. These operations include or have included all phases of crisis management.

Table 1: Interventions Exterior to the European Union

III- Results and perspectives

A- Successes and inadequacies of European crisis management methods

The increase in crisis management operations undertaken by the European Union over the last few years makes it possible to draw up an overview of the results achieved by the "European crisis management method". According to many observers the EU's capabilities and know-how in terms of crisis management are far beyond those of NATO and the USA [29]. Inadequacies do exist however both in the EU's decision making process as well as in the intervention and action capabilities of the latter.

1) A problematic decision making process

The lack of one authority in terms of foreign policy comprises the main obstacle to the effectiveness and continuity of action external to the European Union. In addition to the division of competences between the Commission and the Council we must also include the permanent danger of disagreement between Member States within the Council itself.

With regard to the first of these divisions the Constitutional Treaty plans for one person only to assume the positions of European Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative for the CFSP/Secretary General of the Council. The rejection of the text, in the expectation of a hypothetical adoption of its institutional measures leaves no other choice but that of ad hoc co-ordination solutions.

In March 2003 the Council drew up some "procedural proposals for global, coherent European crisis management" [30]. The most recent operations suggest that the Commission and the Council are now able to co-ordinate their crisis management tools very quickly in emergency situations [31]. The danger of rivalry and mutual contradiction still exists however and will not be overcome long term but for negotiation and strong political will on the part of the Member States.

In spite of the unity shown during recent external operations the latter are still separated by divergent geographic traditions and tropisms [32]. These differences have been attenuated until now by the relatively consensual nature of the operations undertaken, the military size and dimension of which have remained limited enjoying the agreement of both international and Atlantic institutions. A situation whereby the European Union was forced to undertake a major military operation alone would from this point of view be a true test. Such a situation would probably demand close co-ordination between France and the UK and between these two countries and their partners.

For the most ordinary crises European States' ability to act together appears to be increasingly satisfactory. The increased usage of enhanced or structured co-operation agreements seems to improve the ability for joint action [33]. In all events it is in the interest of each and every one that the co-ordination between Union members at each stage in the development of a crisis improves in the future.

2) The strengthening of military capabilities

In the wake of the programme adopted by the European Council in December 2004 the strengthening of the intervention capabilities of European armed forces is now a subject of discussion. Adequacies in this area have been identified [34] :

3) The strengthening of civil capabilities

The European Council of June 2004 adopted an action plan for civil crisis management capabilities. This action plan identifies priorities with regard to enhancing and integrating European capabilities and establishes 2008 as the deadline for the completion of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008.

At the end of 2004, Member States provided the Union with 5,761 police officers, 631 State of Law specialists, 562 civil administrators and 4,988 civil protection staff. Commitments made by the various States within the framework of the Headline Goal 2008 were confirmed in 2005. The Conference on the Improvement of Civil Capabilities on 21st November 2005 did however identify the progress still to be made [36]. This involves in particular the rapidity of deploying civil personnel to the crisis zone and the quality of staff know-how. The Conference therefore proposed the establishment of a "target list" of inadequacies to be covered as a priority as well as work to improve staff training and the enhancement of co-ordination between Member States in this area, notably thanks to an exchange of "good practice". The Conference also proposed to increase the involvement of Member States in all stages of crisis management operations undertaken by the European Union and stressed the need for everyone to continue work in order to achieve the objectives established for civil capabilities by the CFSP.

For its part the European Commission has reworked its programmes for aid and co-operation to the benefit of the CFSP objectives in terms of resolving conflicts, managing crises and consolidating State structures [37]. In September 2004, it also proposed the establishment of a Stability Instrument designed to enhance the coherence and rapidity of European response to natural disasters. This process was speeded up after the tsunami in December 2004. After the Action Plan presented by the Luxembourg Presidency on 31st January 2005 the Commission proposed a series of measures in a Communication dated 20th April 2005 that was designed to "enhance the European Union's capability to confront crises and disasters in third countries" [38]. The measures put forward aim in particular to heighten the rapidity and response provided by the mechanisms to distribute humanitarian aid in crisis areas [39], to improve the coherence and co-ordination of national, community and international policies and to strengthen the Community Civil Protection Mechanism by "improving the links between Community programmes and the European Union's civil and military capabilities." On 27th January 2006 the Commission also suggested a series of measures designed to enhance the Union's Civil Protection Mechanism [40].

B- Moving towards a European culture of crisis management

Crisis management and State re-construction operations in a given territory are often likely to encounter numerous obstacles: uncertainty about the territory's international status [41], coexistence on this territory of opposing communities, existence of political and moral traditions that are incompatible with liberal democracy or even with a modern, bureaucratic, secular form of State [42]. European thoughts into crisis management cannot then only be limited to issues of procedure and capability must it must also encompass a theoretical dimension. Research into the area of comparative political culture and even issues of political philosophy should find a role in defining the Union's external strategy. It is by taking into account the possibility that its own political model is not applicable everywhere and by acting adequately as a result of this that the European Union will be better prepared to face the complexity and unforeseeable nature of crises that will occur in the 21st century [43].

Conclusion

In spite of the considerable progress made over the last few years it is still probably too early to conclude that the European method of crisis management is successful. Most of the operations undertaken by the Union are not yet complete; the question of the future ability of the territories thus covered to govern themselves and of the internal and international political legitimacy of their new governments still remains to be seen. Moreover these operations have until now been limited in size. No one can foresee how the Union and its States would react in the face of a major political-military crisis

Recent history shows quite clearly however that military power alone is inadequate in solving modern crises. Armed intervention that is not followed up by a concerted stabilisation effort accompanied by the reconstruction of a viable political structure runs, on the contrary, the danger of degenerating into uncontrollable disorder. The return of internal political order in a territory where there has been none comprises the fundamental challenge of modern times. Having now adopted a global approach, both military and civil, to crisis management and by continuing to enhance its capabilities to act and its analysis tools the European Union is asserting itself as a major vector of security on an international level.